The Marshall Plan Memorial Lecture [on the challenges of future enlargement and relations of industrialized nations with nations in the non-industrialized world] by the Right Honorable Roy Jenkins, President, Commission of the European Communities. Bonn, 3 June 1977 by Jenkins, Roy.
THE MARSHALL PLAN 
MEMORIAL LECTURE 
Bonn 
June 3, 1977 
THE RIGHT HONORABLE ROY JENKINS 
PRESIDENT 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES June 1977 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the speech by General 
George C.  Marshall which gave birth to the European Recovery Pro-
gram, the Marshall  Plan.  It also marked  the fifth anniversary of the 
German  Marshall  Fund  of the  United  States,  a  private  U.S.  grant-
making institution located  in Washington, D.C.  The  Fund  was estab-
lished in 1972 by a gift of the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, as a memorial to the Marshall Plan, to promote understand-
ing of problems common to industrial societies. 
To commemorate the Marshall  Plan,  the Board  of Trustees of the 
Fund  has  established  a Marshall  Plan  Memorial  Lecture.  The  Right 
Honorable Roy Jenkins, President of the Commission of the European 
Communities, delivered the first Lecture on  June 3,  1977 at "La Re-
doute" in Bonn-Bad Godesberg. 
President  Jenkins'  letture  is  reprinted  in  this  commemorative 
brochure. It also includes anniversary messages from President Carter 
and Chancellor Schmidt and the remarks delivered on this occasion by 
the President of the German Bundestag, Professor Karl  Carstens,  by 
the State Minister of the Foreign Office of the Federal  Republic, Dr. 
Klaus von Dohnanyi, and by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of 
the German Marshall Fund, Professor Harvey Brooks. 
The  German Marshall Fund 
of the United States ANNIVERSARY  MESSAGES 
On the thirtieth anniversary of the European Recovery Program,  I wish to 
express the appreciation of the American people for the Federal Republic's 
magnanimous gift five years ago which provides the financial basis for the 
German  Marshall  Fund  of the United  States. 
Three  decades  ago the  Marshall Plan enabled  Europeans  and Americans 
to  work  together to  meet essential  human  needs  in  the  difficult post-war 
years, to rebuild cities  and to create the  means of employment.  Today the 
social,  economic,  and political issues that trouble Europe and America  and 
other regions are less visible and dramatic. But they are more complex and 
deep-rooted  and  will  require  a cooperative  effort  as  great  as  that  of the 
Marshall  Plan. 
Governments  and  international  organizations  cannot master these  prob-
lems by themselves.  We  need  the help  of private institutions like the  Fund 
which are dedicated to assisting Americans and Europeans to work together 
toward  a solution  of our common  problems. 
Our industrial societies have much to learn from each other and from the 
other nations of the world. The unique gift of the German people is making it 
possible for new generations of Europeans and Americans to exchange ideas 
and  experiences  in  surmounting the problems which  confront our peoples. 
The  Marshall Plan  could  have  no finer memorial. 
President Jimmy  Carter 
To  the  trustees  and  officers  as  well  as  to  the  American  and  German 
friends of the German Marshall Fund  of the United States I extend  my  most 
cordial  congratulations  on  the  occasion  of  the  Fund's  fifth  anniversary.  I 
consider it a manifestation of the German-American friendship that the Fund 
has chosen Bonn to celebrate this anniversary and I regret deeply not to be 
able to  be  with  you  today.  The  activities  and  achievements  of  the  Fund's 
first five years have been impressive and I send  my very best wishes for its 
continued  good work. 
Federal  Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
3 INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR HARVEY BROOKS 
Chairman of the Board of the German Marshall Fund; Benjamin Peirce 
Professor of Technology and Public Policy, Harvard University 
It  is my pleasant duty to introduce to you the first Marshall Plan Memorial 
Lecturer. It is an anomaly, perhaps, for an American to be introducing a 
European to Europeans. Not only a European but the person who more than 
any other represents that one European voice which is referred to so often in 
America. 
For this reason and for many others it is fitting that the first Marshall Plan 
Memorial Lecturer is the Right Honorable Roy Jenkins, President of the 
Commission of the European Communities. The Board of Trustees of the 
German Marshall Fund was delighted when he  agreed to accept our invitation 
to deliver this lecture. And it is a pleasure, on behalf of the Board, to welcome 
him here this afternoon. 
President Jenkins  has had a  long and distinguished career in British 
politics, and his ties to both the United States and Europe are as many as they 
are varied. An author of many historical works and a member of the House of 
Commons for nearly thirty years, he has held high government posts, includ-
ing that of Chancellor of the Exchequer and, most recently, Home Secretary. 
If I may be permitted at this point to speak for a moment of Mr. Jenkins's 
early connection with the Fund. As Home Secretary he took the initiative in 
inviting representatives of the Vera Institute of Justice of New York City-
whose Director, Mr. Herbert Sturz, is also with us today- to work with 
experts in the Home Office to test in the U.K. certain procedures relating to 
bail and to work for former offenders found successful in New York. The 
German Marshall Fund was pleased to have provided support for this effort. 
Mr. Jenkins left his post as Home Secretary to assume the presidency of the 
Commission of the European Communities on the first of January 1977. 
As a historian and one with a deep understanding of the U.S., he has 
referred  often to the different origins and paths of the United States  of 
America and the uniting states of Europe and to the different nature of the 
separation of  powers between the White House, the Congress, and the courts 
in America on the one hand and between the Commission, the Council of 
Ministers, the Europeait Parliament, and the European Court of Justice on  this 
side of the Atlantic on the other hand. 
As an experienced politician, he is aware of the practical difficulties that 
face a uniting Europe, both internally and in regulating its relations with 
countries outside the Community. As a statesman, though, he has called on 
Europeans to lift their sights. "To  make our deeds a little better than our words 
...  to always do more than we promise to do," as he put it to the European 
Parliament last February. 
As historian, politician, and statesman - as all three - Roy Jenkins is 
superlatively qualified to deliver the first Marshall Plan Memorial Lecture. 
Ladies and Gentlemen: The President of the Commission of the European 
Communities, Roy Jenkins. 
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THE MARSHALL PLAN MEMORIAL LECTURE 
THE RIGHT HONORABLE ROY JENKINS 
President of the Commission of the European Communities 
It is a great honour to be asked to deliver this, the first Marshall Plan 
Memorial Lecture. I shall address myself to two principal themes: first, the 
challe~ge that faces the European Community in the prospect of its further 
enlargement, and second, the challenge that faces the industrialised nations 
as  a whole in their relationship with the non-industrialised world. But I 
would like to begin with a reference back to  1947 as  I believe it is  both 
instructive and appropriate to examine these issues against the backcloth of 
the Marshall Plan as well as being an appropriate acknowledgement of the 
occasion on which we now meet. There are important lessons to be learned. 
Like many seminal political speeches the idea contained in the Harvard 
Commencement Address of 1947 had been thoroughly worked over, but the 
preparation of the speech itself was  a  last minute rush. General George 
Marshall had in fact said that he could not attend the Harvard ceremony but 
the opportunity of carrying his.ideas further at that moment encouraged him 
to change his mind and use the occasion for a major speech. It  may not have 
seemed to the audience of students, alumni and parents a very dramatic 
occasion that day under the elms in Harvard Yard. Marshall was no orator. 
The speech read much better than it sounded. It did not propound ready-
made solutions. The U.S. Administration was persuaded that public opinion 
at home needed more time to respond to its ideas, and that public opinion in 
Europe needed no more than a hint, not a programme of action. In Europe it 
had an immediate effect, most of all on the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, who, by-passing official advice that perhaps it would be sensible first 
to ask what the Secretary of State had in mind, made it clear that the problem 
was not what Marshall meant, but how Europe would respond. As Marshall 
himself put it in the speech: 
"It  would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to 
undertake to draw up unilaterally, a program designed to place 
Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Euro-
peans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe." 
The critical four-year period that followed the Marshall Plan set in motion 
the two main currents that have formed relations between the United States 
and Europe over the past thirty years. First, the Marshall Plan in its concep-
tion and its implementation implanted in  American foreign policy the idea of 
Europe as a possible and credible political and economic unity. Of course, it 
did not obliterate other views. An occasionally irritable incomprehension at a 
divided and unimaginative old world remained. From time to time the desire 
to remake that old world entire and new in an American image rose to the 
surface. But neither of these extremes was predominant for long. The normal 
view was the post-Marshall view. It was neither imperial nor isolationist. 
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Europe the first  of many steps  which she was  to  take  towards her own 
integration. The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, the Coal 
and Steel Community, Euratom, the Economic Community and then the 
fusion of the three Communities themselves were foreshadowed in part that 
afternoon in Harvard Yard. 
As a result of European determination and trans-Atlantic support, Europe, 
and in particular the European Community, today displays a picture sharply 
different from the 1947landscape of penury and insecurity. Compared with 
that Europe whose trade and economy had been crushed by war and whose 
horizons could embrace little more than a survival through the next winter, it 
is now, in the form of the European Community, a single and relatively 
prosperous common market, the largest trading unit in  the world. The pattern 
of  European relations with the United States has changed from one of depen-
dence to one of interdependence. The political and economic cohesion of 
Europe has grown, not to the extent that the optimists of the previous genera-
tion would have wished, nor as far as some of us would desire, but it has 
grown, and the world outside, sometimes more than we ourselves, has come 
to take the European Community very seriously indeed. 
This is not, however, the contemporary picture you hear in the public 
utterances of politicians or read in the political comment of journalists. The 
post-1973 recession and current rates of inflation and unemployment under-
standably influence the perspectives of us all: they reinforce a widespread 
feeling that the Community needs to be revitalised and regain a clearer sense 
of purpose and momentum. I share that feeling. Despite its difficulties, the 
Community should begin to take itself as seriously as the world outside takes 
it.  I point to the contrast with the slough of despond in the immediate 
post-war years to mark the distance we have travelled and illustrate the 
strengths and resourcefulness I believe we possess to overcome our own 
major problems. 
What are the problems? The first is the problem of the distribution of 
economic strength within our boundaries. The second is  the question of 
enlargement. They are closely linked. The first problem first.  The conse-
quence of the Common Market in its lifting of trade barriers made a major 
contribution to achieving the surge forward of the 1960s and the relative 
prosperity that exists in much of the Community today. It  intensified Com-
munity trade, increased contacts at all levels, and advanced European inte-
gration in the process. But the limitations of this original, laissez-faire ap-
proach have already become evident. The gap between rich and poor regions 
of the Community has not narrowed but widened and it is now obvious that, 
without complementary policies to those of free intra-Community competi-
tion, there is a real danger that the already poor economic situations in  certain 
regions may be aggravated. The economically liberal principles of the Com~ 
mon Market took the original Six a long way during what now seems, at least 
in the glow of retrospect, a much more favourable general economic climate. 
But in less good years and without additional policies to hand, they are not 
only insufficient but in some ways even dangerous. Such a common market 
therefore cannot and does not any longer represent the conceptual frontier of 
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the Community economy. The Community's public sector, in its regional, 
manpower, investment and industrial policies already seeks to redistribute 
finance and encourage investment in order to balance the economic fortunes 
of Member States and regions of the Community. The divergences between 
different regions cannot just be ignored. The Regional Fund, for example, has 
become an integral part of Community action. In the future, the Fund must be 
renewed, reinforced, and made more effective. The financial instruments at 
the Communities' disposal must  be coordinated and deployed to produce the 
maximum impact. 
But Community action, whether through the Regional or Social Funds, or 
through the European Investment Bank or  other borrowing and lending 
functions, is still very limited. The aim is to assist economic convergence, to 
keep on a politically acceptable track the forces of private economic integra-
tion set into motion by the creation of the Common Market. This involves 
mechanisms to steer employment and investment into the sectors and regions 
which are most vulnerable to economic circumstances. Community institu-
tions have available only a limited range of actions from which to choose. 
There are three open to us: first, the choice of priorities in the Community 
budget, second, the enhancement of our non-budgetary finances, i.e., our 
borrowing and lending powers and, third, the development of our legal 
powers of financial intervention in both fields. Nor are the sums of money 
large in relation to national budgets. The Community budget represents less 
than 1% of Community G.N.P. Nonetheless, with relatively small increases 
and selective action we can link our Community means to our general Com-
munity economic objective of a  convergent and adaptive economy.  The 
Commission is currently considering important proposals in these areas. 
It  is at this point that the Community's own  future economic cohesion and 
the prospect of enlargement are linked. There are here three essential princi-
ples. First, the Treaty clearly envisages the acceptance of European countries 
who are qualified to join. The founding fathers intended a Europe for Euro-
peans. The Six, attached to parliamentary democracy, became Nine, on the 
basis of this common attachment. It  would damagingly undercut our demo-
cratic purpose if  the Community failed to sustain and support  those European 
countries which have emerged from dictatorship. The peoples of these coun-
tries look to the Community as a guarantee of free elections. As we approach 
the prospect of enlargement, let us not forget we are also on the brink of direct 
elections for the European Parliament. That symbolism will not be lost upon 
the applicants; let it not be lost on us. The three Community institutions-
Commission, Parliament and Council-recently, in  the presence of the Court 
of Justice, solemnly signed and thereby re-emphasised their commitment to 
human rights. We cannot then turn and say that enlargement is too difficult, 
and shut the door on those whose democracy we have just underwritten. The 
process of seeing how the Community can grow is not instantaneous. Because 
it is not, there are bound to be moments when an apparent lack of speed is 
interpreted pessimistically. It is at such moments that our political commit-
ment should not be forgotten. 
The second principle must be that, while each country should be treated 
individually in negotiations and discussion, it is neither in their individual 
7 interest, nor that of the existing Community as a whole to ignore the inter-
relationship between them. The pace of decision must be different, and it is 
already so. Membership negotiations with Greece are in progress. The Por-
tuguese application has been received and the Commission asked for its 
opinion. Spain has not yet applied. There should be no question of holding 
back our discussions with one country in  order to waitfor another. We should 
not have comprehensive negotiations, but we should not, of course, try to 
divide our minds up into separate compartments and avoid taking a com-
prehensive view. 
The third principle is that the Community must, faced with the problem of 
enlargement,  be  ready  to  develop,  realistically,  its  own  political  and 
economic arrangements. Political realism means that internally we must be 
ready to make institutional improvements if  we are to adapt, at all efficiently, 
to the prospect of enlargement. Economically we must match our stand for 
democracy with a preparedness to sustain it in practice. It  is this latter point I 
should like to develop. 
Some doubt the capacity of the Community to undergo a further enlarge-
ment without being broken in the process. It has, in historical terms, only 
recently grown, and not without difficulty, from six to nine, and this was 
negotiated at a time of relative economic strength to absorb new Member 
States whose level of industrial and commercial development for the most 
part broadly matched that of the original members. Now, at a time of much 
greater economic difficulties, the Community must embrace the prospect of 
the membership of countries, which, while differing in their relative indus-
trial base, share common features which pose particular problems for existing 
Community arrangements - especially in agriculture. 
I underestimate neither the range nor importance of these problems. They 
must be faced, and be faced openly. But I equally believe that a pessimistic 
approach is  founded on the wrong analysis of the Community's stage of 
development. Pessimism would assure that we are no more than a common 
market with some agricultural and industrial appendages. But this stage has 
already been passed. If it had not, I would myself face the prospect of en-
largement with a sense of foreboding. The mere trading arrangement has a 
crucial and logical limitation. It means you must hold very tightly to the 
geographical extent of the club. 
But  even within the existing  Community boundary we have passed 
beyond that phase. We have our essential political purposes, which have 
always been a vital background to our economic methods. We have recog-
nised our own regional, sectoral and unemployment problems. We  have 
started to tackle them. The Commission is committed to improving our  means 
of doing so. And we cannot in that process ignore the impact on the Commu-
nity economy of applicant countries. The structural differences and difficul-
ties of the emerging democracies of Southern Europe are a part of, and not 
wholly separate from, the Community's own present and pressing problems. 
If  we have the courage to face this issue frankly, there is an opportunity for the 
Community to act here and to work out a programme of assistance that 
benefits both the Community and applicant countries. The anniversary of the 
birth of the Marshall Plan is, I believe, an appropriate moment for  us to 
8 
I 
commit ourselves to meet that challenge. The courageous and imaginative 
statesmen of thirty years ago, both in America and in Europe, faced more 
daunting difficulties than we do today. We must not only commemorate 
them, but seek to emulate their courage. If  we do so, we can tum the risks of 
enlargement into the catalysts of future progress. If  Europe was ready enough 
to welcome Marshall Aid thirty years  ago,  let it now tum the economic 
strength it has and its capacity to develop its existing policies in an equally 
constructive way to a similar vital purpose. 
I have spoken up to now of what must primarily be a European preoccupa-
tion. I should like to tum to one which is global. The differences between the 
industrial and non-industrial parts of Europe are no more than a reflection in 
miniature of similar, and deeper differences between rich and poor in the 
world. Here, still more than in the opposition of power blocs, lies the major 
problem of our time. It  was the realisation that an active engagement to face 
up to this problem could no longer be postponed that led to the calling of the 
Conference on International Economic Cooperation. The mere convening of 
this Conference was a substantial step forward. The groups principally con-
cerned had a framework in which they could define the problems involved, 
and begin a machinery to put solutions in hand. Throughout the Conference 
the European Community has been able to play an important part, thanks to 
the high level of coordination ainong its members and to a lesser extent with 
other groups in the industrialised world. This has not been a coordination 
directed against our partners in this dialogue; on the contrary, the indus-
trialised countries have put forward proposals out of an evolving sense of 
international responsibility. This responsibility does not stem from a need to 
pay conscience money for possible misdeeds in the past or a pervading sense 
of guilt about the present. It is a responsibility resulting from an objective 
analysis of the situation, and the complementarity of the needs of the different 
parts of the world. 
I do not suggest that there no longer exists any moral imperative for the 
richer industrialised countries of the world to accept a responsibility for 
righting the injustice of poverty. At least 500 million people will not  have had 
enough to eat today. That has regrettably been the case for a long time. But, for 
perhaps the past ten years it has also been recognised that, as the ballince of 
population shifted more and more towards developing countries, we would 
all of us in the West, however well we ordered our affairs, be in increasing 
danger of being separated from the rest of the world by so narrow a gulf of 
geography but so wide a gulf of comprehension and living conditions. Our 
belief in the universality of human rights unites with an enlightened self-
interest to make us more determined than  before to reject such a future. Only if 
there is continuing progress towards a fairer world can we be sure that the 
somewhat reduced tension of East/West relations is not replaced by a still 
more dangerous and deep-seated cleavage between the rich and the poor 
world. 
But there has been, over the past four or five years, an important and 
different advance. There has been the increasing recognition that a purely 
charitable approach fails to respond to the real interdependence between the 
economies of the industrialised West and the less-developed primary pro-
9 ducers. The Community itself has given a strong lead in proffering more 
practical and relevant arrangements - notably under the Lome Convention. 
Our scheme to help stabilise the export income of developing countries, 
which it is  now envisaged should be studied on a world scale, and the 
progress made on stabilising the price of basic raw materials, have been good 
examples.  We  have learned the lesson that the health of  world trade is 
dependent not on the maintenance of a privileged position in and for the 
West, but on a process of practical cooperation with the developing world. 
The United Nations Conference of last year and this week's CIEC meeting in 
Paris - which in my view achieved more than has yet been recognised -
signal an awareness that we have made the mature transition from the idea of 
aid for the Third World to the idea of cooperation in the interest of us all. 
Hitherto, in relations with the developing world, the Community has not 
only been in the lead but has been well in the lead. I recall writing myself five 
years ago that the greatest deficiency in the world aid scene at that time was 
the poor performance of the world's richest country. I wrote then, as I speak 
today, as a friend and not as a natural critic of the United States, and I am glad 
to record that the view taken by the present United States Administration is in 
considerable contrast with my gloomy reflections at that time. The Commu-
nity is still ahead, but it now shares with the United States the same basic 
approach to this fundamental problem. In President Carter's recent com-
mencement address at Notre Dame he made this clear in  the following words: 
"We can no longer have a policy solely for the industrialised nations as the 
foundation of global stability; we must respond to the new reality of a politi-
cally awakening world." It is to the mutual support of both Europe and the 
Uclted States if we can share a common vision of the interdependence of our 
actions in the world. 
But the relationship between the United States and Europe should not 
exist only, or even primarily, at the level of political decision. The fact that I 
am today delivering the first Marshall Plan Memorial Lecture, sponsored by 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States, is itself proof of the contrary, 
as also is the type of work in which the Fund has engaged itself. By setting up 
the Fund as a memorial to the Marshall Plan, the Federal Republic not only 
made a generous gesture in keeping with the Plan itself, but  provided an ideal 
vehicle for  the type of international contacts and studies which are the 
lifeblood of mobile societies like those of the Western world. It  is not only the 
developing countries which need a transfer of technology, a new idea or an 
experienced example to follow. Industrialised nations too need to organise 
and encourage the flow of information, techniques and approaches to com-
mon problems, in order to stimulate the renewal of their inventiveness. There 
are several domestic areas where the exchange of experience between Europe 
and the United States could be especially fruitful: for example, the com~ari­
son of approaches to the problems of urban living  and of ways of running a 
modern industrial society, in particular the tripartite approach to the prob-
lems of unemployment and economic management, and the straightforward 
exchange of high technology in industry. To this end, I have never been in 
favour of purely intergovernmental exchanges; a whole range of indepen-
dent, non-governmental studies is needed. The German Marshall Fund of the 
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United States is doing invaluable work in this field. 
Europe has become, thirty years from the Marshall Plan, a coherent Com-
munity. Indeed, paradoxically, this identity is often more clearly perceived 
by others than by ourselves. Its policy, formed, sometimes with difficulty, 
under the pressure of its own particular conditions and constraints is not in 
any way tributary to the policy of others. We need not be tempted either by 
fear of undue subordination or feel the need to over-asset our independence 
by unnecessary intransigence. Our actions in the North/South dialogue have 
proved this. But Europe's international strength must be matched by our 
capacity to respond effectively to the tasks which face it closer at home-of 
which its overall cohesion in the face of the impending enlargement of the 
Community is the greatest. There is no reason why we should not overcome 
this challenge. Each time in the past the Community has been faced with a 
really fundamental decision about its future, it has faced up to it and sur-
mounted it  successfully. This has been the way forward in the past; I believe it 
will again be so in the future. REMARKS BY PROFESSOR KARL CARSTENS 
President of the German Bundestag 
It  is a great pleasure to welcome you on  behalf of the German Bundestag in 
Bonn on this highly significant occasion. 
The observance of the double anniversary which has brought us together 
here presents an opportunity to contemplate the past and also to tum  towards 
the future. 
When Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall, almost thirty years ago to 
the day, in  his historic speech at Harvard University set forth the idea that the 
United States of America should lend assistance to the war-shattered Euro-
pean nations, the world witnessed the birth of a programme which in its 
political dimensions is without parallel in history. How was this signal from 
Cambridge received in a crippled and weary post-war Europe? Certainly, the 
Old Continent would hardly have been able to liberate itself by its own efforts 
from the pressures of misery, distress, and desperation. The immediate and 
generous help extended by the American people sparked new hope among 
the peoples of Europe. This American initiative restored the Europeans' faith 
in the future and brought back their will to live. The German people in 
particular feel a special obligation towards the United States for having been 
included from the very beginning in the European Recovery Programme. 
This gratitude is not lessened by the fact that the process of the reconstruc-
tion of Europe has meanwhile been completed. True, German debts from 
Marshall Plan aid have formally-in  a financial sense-been repaid. But the 
Marshall concept lives on in the European Recovery Programmes which are 
still today and will remain a valuable complex of operations. For these aid 
programmes represent in particular valuable support for our medium-sized 
businesses, for development aid, and for Berlin. 
Let me take this opportunity, ladies and gentlemen, to speak also of a 
statesman from the Old Continent whose achievements supplemented the 
impetus from the  New World. For without  Ludwig Erhard's political imagina-
tion and farsightedness even the initial spark of the Marshall Plan, in itself, 
would hardly have been enough to get the motor of the German economy into 
high gear once more. That essential supplementary contribution was pro-
vided by Ludwig Erhard as he  was in  charge of the economy of the then  British 
and American occupation zones. As we know, he went on from this initial 
contribution to become Minister of Economics of the new Federal Republic of 
Germany  and later  its  Chancellor.  His  concept had far-reaching  conse-
quences. It  restored the free interplay of the market. Thanks to his unrelenting 
struggle to liberate the economy from control, American help achieved its 
declared goal of safeguarding the recipient countries' capability for survival, 
not least on German soil. The answer of Europeans to the American offer has 
been and still  is a  growing  readiness  and preparedness  to  take  on co-
responsibilities extending beyond national and even European horizons. We 
Germans were of the opinion that we had to go a step further to keep alive the 
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ago we laid the fmanctal cornerstone for the establishment of the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States. 
The successful work of this foundation as reflected in its Five Year Report 
bears out and justifies the original conception. The current main thrusts of the 
Fund's operations-urban problems, the working world, land  utilization and 
area  planning, criminal  justice administration, communications and the 
media, international raw material, and other economic problems - may 
change with time. 
But the basic concern remains: to enable Americans and Europeans to 
learn from  each other and to work together in coping with national and 
international problems. To find common answers to the growing challenges 
?four time-that remains the continuing task of the Fund. We are especially 
mdebted to the Board of Trustees of the Fund and to its Honorary Trustees for 
their voluntary and responsible sense of dedication. We,  Americans and 
Europeans, are all called upon to do our utmost to support these people in 
their continual search for new approaches and ways to cope with the prob-
lems confronting us all. 
Finally, I wish to congratulate the Board of Trustees of the Fund on its 
decision to  engage Roy  Jenkins, the President of the Commission of the 
European Communities, as speaker on this occasion. As a pioneer of many 
years'  standing for  the unification of Europe and as  holder of the most 
important office in the European Executive, President Jenkins as few others is 
competent to present to you Europe's views regarding the possibilities for the 
necessary cooperation between .the Old Continent and the New World. 
~e  list of unsolved national and international problems is long. Urgent 
questions as regards the supply of energy and raw materials, the relationship 
between industrialized countries and the Third World-but even the rela-
tions between citizen and state-remain to be answered. The peoples on  both 
sides of the Atlantic must pull together in order to find these answers. 
In this spirit let me wish your undertakings every success. 
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State Minister in the Foreign Office 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 
First let me thank you for giving me this opportunity to say a few words in 
place of Willy Brandt, who long  ago  arranged a  series  of meetings and 
discussions in Rome for this day. 
At the beginning of festivities marking the thirtieth anniversary of the 
Marshall Plan we must express our thanks. Thanks to the American people 
and to the then Secretary of State of the United States, George Marshall, who 
in his address to the students of Harvard University on June 5, 1947, laid the 
spiritual foundations for this recovery program for Europe and thus for the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The German Marshall Fund of the United 
States, which was created in 1972 as a memorial to the Marshall Plan, is 
intended to express this gratitude not only in words, but at least partly in 
deeds as well. 
To those who were able to follow developments in Europe and the United 
States in 1947 with some political understanding, George Marshall's gener-
ous proposal seemed to be an extremely rational one, which would also serve 
.Anlerican interests. After all, in his speech Marshall also pointed out: "It is 
logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the 
return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no 
political stability and no assured peace." 
But even if  one takes into account the political interest of the United States 
in the recovery of Europe during the years immediately following World War 
II, the magnitude of Marshall Plan help is astounding, even from today's point 
of view. The European countries received altogether in the years 1948-1951 
some $13 billion in Marshall Plan aid, and this sum represented almost 1.5% 
of the national income of the United States during those years. Per capita 
every American contributed some $85 to the Marshall Plan aid. And every 
citizen in Great Britain, France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany 
received, on the average, during these years some $56 in aid, and that rep-
resented nearly 3% of per capita income in Europe. 
The Marshall Plan, for which we say once again thank you today, was 
intended to be magnanimous. In the words of George Marshall: "Such assis-
tance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises 
develop." 
As I said-at the beginning must be our thanks. But we also share a sense 
of  respect for this magnanimous and politically farsighted help. In that sense 
the Marshall Plan of 1947 also represents an obligation for us today, in 1977. 
An obligation, first of all, in regard to the relations between Europe and the 
United States. An obligation which should remind us Europeans time and 
again that we are inseparable partners of the United States. And that we are 
committed to solidarity with our friends even in difficult years such as the 
United States experienced in the early seventies. 
In connection with the Marshall Plan the argument is frequently heard 
14 
¥' 
these days that the industrial nations today should accept a similar obligation 
towards the developing countries. I would like to point out how questionable 
this comparison is: the United States recognized in 1947 that Europe, despite 
its considerable social, economic, and political strengths, was in danger of 
hopelessly drifting  into serious  difficulties because of  acute production 
shortcomings. "It  has become obvious during recent months that this visible 
destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric 
of European economy." America, in other words, was able to help a group of 
nations which, because of  their history and their existing infrastructure, were 
in a position to help themselves with this additional help. 
The relations between the industrial nations and the developing countries 
today cannot be compared with the situation in 1947 .Then the United States 
and Europe shared basic structural similarities and an equal  number of 
people. Today, the relationship between the industrial nations and the de-
veloping countries is precisely marked by the fact that this is not the case, 
neither structurally nor in terms of the number of people; there are many more 
people living in developing countries than in the industrial countries. 
Although the starting position for the Marshall Plan in 194 7 can in  no way 
be compared with the difficulties in the relationship between North and 
South today, the Marshall Plan remains of exemplary nature. Were the coun-
tries of Europe to raise today aid for the developing countries in approxi-
mately the same order of magnitude as the Americans did between 1948 and 
1951, our aid would have to be more than double that of the period then. The 
difference between the development aid of the Europeans and that which we 
Europeans would have to contribute, if we were to follow the example of the 
Marshall Plan, would amount to some $30 billion over a period of four years. 
The fact  that we are not able to provide aid in such magnitude has 
something to do (as absurd as this may sound) with our present standard of 
living-with the demands we are all making, which already are taxing the 
capabilities of our economies to their limits. 
The challenge to the European industrial nations in the year 1977 thus is 
not comparable to the challenge faced by the United States in 1947. But the 
example set by the United States in 1947 makes us feel very modest indeed. 
Today, other steps and other decisions are required, differer{t from those in 
1947,  but they are still steps and decisions which require a comparable 
measure of political imagination and economic sacrifice. To effect this is our 
task today, and also one way of expressing thanks to George Marshall and our 
friends in the United States. 